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Abstract 
 
Due to the nature of the international legal system the ICJ is regularly presented with new 
questions about which international law is unclear or to which it does not yet extend – and is 
thereby incomplete. The approach of the ICJ when faced with such gaps raises some 
fundamental questions about the nature of the international legal system and the judicial 
function of the ICJ. The purpose of this article is to revisit and the critically evaluate the issue 
of how the ICJ responds when faced with a gap or lacuna in the law. 
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Introduction 
 
In the 2010 Kosovo Advisory Opinion the ICJ was faced with a question to which it considered 
international law gave no answer.1 The Court was requested by the General Assembly to 
provide an answer to the question: ‘Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo in accordance with international law?’2 
The Court concluded that “the inconclusiveness of state practice … lead to the conclusion that 
‘general international law contains no prohibition of declarations of independence” and thereby 
the declaration was not unlawful.3 In its reasoning the Court implied that in the absence of a 
rule of international law prohibiting the conduct in question, there exists what Julius Stone 
called a ‘residual negative principle’ that whatever is not prohibited in law is permitted.4 Put 
another way, the Court was unable to identify an applicable rule of law that prohibited the 
conduct – an absence of law;5 otherwise referred to here as ‘a gap’ in the law - the Court thereby 
resorted to a ‘residual negative principle’ to fill the gap – equating a lack of prohibition with 
permission.  
 
 
1 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010 [hereinafter Kosovo]. Available at http://www.icj- 
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=4 
2 General Assembly resolution A/Res/63/3, 8 October 2008; Report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Interim Administration of Kosovo, S/2008/692, 24 November 2008, at para 3 
3 See Kosovo, supra note 1, at Para. 79, 114 and 121; The Court also examined whether the declaration 
of independence violated Security Council Resolution 1244 or the Constitutional Framework created 
through it. The Court concluded that the declaration did not violate either of these instruments.; See 
also ‘Recent International Advisory Opinion’  124 Harvard Law Review (2010-2011) p. 1100  
4 J. Stone, ‘Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the International Community’, 35 British Yearbook 
of International Law (1959) p. 136 
5 I. Tammelo, ‘On the Logical Openness of Legal Orders: A Modal Analysis of Law with Special 
Reference to the Logical Status of Non Liquet in International Law, 8(2) American Society of 
Comparative Law (1959) p. 191 
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In his separate declaration to the Kosovo Advisory Opinion Judge Bruno Simma was very 
critical of the ICJ’s resort to such an analysis describing it as “an old tired view of international 
law”6 and being “redolent of nineteenth-century positivism, with its excessively deferential 
approach to State consent.”7 According to Simma, adopting the approach it did the Court 
denied to itself the opportunity to move away from the binary approach to the analysis of 
international law and to analyse “the great shades of nuance that permeate” it.8 In particular, 
Simma argued, this could include that the law may be ‘neutral’ or ‘silent’ on the matter. 
  
In suggesting the potential of international law being neutral, Judge Simma was representing a 
vision of an international legal system that is ‘open’, ‘incomplete’ and with ‘gaps’.  Clearly 
Judge Simma was at odds with the approach of the majority reasoning in the Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion, which asserted a conception of the international legal system that is ‘closed’, in which 
no gaps in the law exist; in so far as where there is no identifiable rule prohibiting conduct then 
that conduct is permitted, therefore there is always a rule of law regulating the conduct; 
meaning the system is closed as an a priori condition. 
 
However, such a view of international law as ‘closed’ as an a priori condition does not 
accurately reflect the fact that courts and tribunals in both domestic legal systems and in the 
international legal system are constantly being presented with new situations in respect of 
which the law is unclear or to which it does not yet extend; thereby international law has gaps 
in a material sense.9 The interesting question posed by Judge Simma’s separate declaration is 
 
6 See Kosovo supra note 1, Separate Declaration Judge Simma, para. 2. 
7 Ibid. para. 8. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See for example Ronald Dworkin who said of law: ‘Law by convention is never complete, because 
new issues constantly arise that have never been settled one way or the other by whatever institutions 
have conventional authority to decide them.’ R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1998) p. 115 
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that where such gaps in international law exist, how should a court or tribunal respond? In the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion the ICJ responded by applying the ‘residual negative principle’ it 
did, thereby presenting the international system as a ‘closed’ normative order. That is one 
approach, but one about which Judge Simma was particularly critical. An alternative approach 
is to see the international legal system not as ‘closed’ normative order but rather as being a 
‘complete’ system of law. Seeing the international legal system as ‘complete’ rather than 
‘closed’ involves the acceptance that there are material gaps in international law but these 
material gaps can be closed by the use of recognisable and accepted legal devices and 
reasoning, thereby making it ‘complete’ ex post facto.10 In Judge Simma’s judgment, however, 
there was, apparently, a ‘third way’ in which a court or tribunal can approach the matter of a 
gap in international law by concluding can conclude that international law is ‘neutral’ or ‘silent’ 
with respect to certain acts and therefore the international legal system is incomplete in 
substance.   
 
The purpose of this article is two-fold. The first part is to critically evaluate the idea of the 
‘closed’ nature of the international legal system on the one hand and the idea of the 
‘completeness’ of the international legal system on the other hand. The second part is to 
examine Judge Simma’s view of ‘the possibility that international law can be neutral… on the 
international lawfulness of certain acts.’11 There are three sections to this analysis. Section two 
will provide a critique of the ICJ’s approach of asserting the closed nature of the international 
legal system by means of applying a ‘residual negative principle’ – this approach is oft 
associated with the reasoning of the PCIJ in the Lotus case and more recently was similarly 
 
10 See P. Weil, ‘”The Court Cannot Conclude Definitively…” Non Liquet Revisited’, 36 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law (1997) p. 110 
11 See Kosovo supra note 1, Separate Declaration Judge Simma, para. 3; this article will not be 
examining the doctrine of non-liquet. 
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employed by the ICJ in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion.  Section three will counter-pose this 
first approach against the view that international law has gaps; therefore is de facto incomplete 
in a material sense, but the international legal system has developed mechanisms for dealing 
with gaps in the law to close any gap, thereby making the international legal system ‘complete’.  
Section four will examine an aspect of Judge Simma’s ‘third way’; that is the possibility that 
international law can be neutral on a matter with a view to trying to understand how one 
conceive of international law’s neutrality.  
 
II. Conceiving of international law as a closed normative order as an a priori condition  
 
There is a view of the international legal system that it is a logically and formally closed 
normative order, ‘in the sense that for every legal question which can be asked… there is a 
determinative answer according to a norm’12 According to Kelsen for example:13  
 
“Existing international law can always be applied to a concrete case, that is to say the 
question whether a state (or another subject of international law) is or is not obliged to 
behave in a certain way. If there is no norm of conventional or customary law imposing 
upon the state (or another subject of international law) the obligation to behave in a 
certain way, the subject is under international law free to behave as it pleases; and by a 
decision to this effect existing international law is applied to the case.”  
 
 
12 I. Tammelo supra note 5, p. 188 
13 H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed. (Revised & edited by Robert W. Tucker 1966) p. 
439. 
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What this means is that where there is no specific rule of law to provide an answer to the 
question before the court, the application of the residual negative principle,14 ‘Whatever is not 
legally prohibited is permitted’,15 will in effect, always provide an answer.16  
 
In practical terms, this view of the formal completeness of international law is synonymous 
with the reasoning of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of the SS Lotus.17 
Moreover, in its 2010 Kosovo Advisory Opinion the ICJ also asserted the formal completeness 
of international law by the utilisation of a ‘residual negative principle’.18 However, these two 
cases do not stand alone as examples of the Court’s adopting an approach that asserts the formal 
completeness of international law in its reasoning. In the Nicaragua case, for example, in 
rejecting the United States arguments with respect to the lawfulness of its countermeasures 
against Nicaragua for its stockpiling of armaments, the ICJ’s reasoning, is emblematic of the 
view of the formal completeness of the international legal system. 19 According to the Court 
“in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the States 
 
14 Stone, supra note 4, p. 136 
15 I. Tammelo supra note 5, p. 188 
16 Ibid.  
17 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10 (Sept. 7) p. 18 [hereinafter Lotus]; The facts 
of the Lotus case are well known and it is not proposed to go over them here. However the reasoning 
the Court adopted in arriving at its decision is pertinent to this discussion. The Permanent Court of 
International Justice stated its now (in)famous dicta: “The rules of law binding upon states … emanate 
from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law …Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.” [p. 
18] According to the Court, international law leaves to States “a wide measure of discretion which is 
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every state remains free to 
adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.” [p. 19].; See H. Handeyside, ‘The Lotus 
Principle in I.C.J. Jurisprudence: Was the Ship Ever Afloat?’, 29 Michigan Journal of International 
Law (2007) p. 80. According to Handeyside ‘…[I]n the face of incompleteness or ambiguity in 
international law, the Lotus principle should mean that international law is complete.’   
18 The ICJ’s approach was subject to strident criticism by Judge Bruno Simma in his Separate 
Declaration, Kosovo, supra note 1, Separate Declaration Judge Simma, Para. 8 et seq. 
19 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), (June 27) 1986 I.C.J. 
14, para. 269 [Hereinafter Nicaragua]; See also Handeyside, supra note 17, at p.  81; Weil, supra note 
10, p. 114. 
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concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be 
limited, and this principle is valid for all states without exception.”20 [Emphasis added] The 
United States had argued that Nicaragua’s stockpiling of weapons justified the United States 
taking countermeasures. However, the Court rejected this claim on the basis that there was no 
international law governing how much weaponry a state could stockpile, therefore a state was 
free to stockpile weapons to the level it chooses. According to this reasoning of the ICJ, in the 
event of there being no applicable law on the matter, a gap, there is automatic application of 
the rule that a state is free to act, which, as in the Lotus case, has the effect of closing the gap 
in the law as an a priori condition; thus presenting the international legal system as a closed 
normative order.  
 
A court or tribunal’s reliance on the utilisation of a ‘residual negative principle’ has an 
important problematic effect however: any absence of a legal prohibition under this principle 
constitutes the presence of a legal permission as it equates “legal neutrality to legal 
permission.”21 Taking the view that where, as a matter of fact, there is no law that has been 
consented to, (i.e. a prohibition) means that a rule of law exists (i.e. a permission to act freely) 
as a means of addressing a lacuna in the law in turn raises problems of the logical coherence 
of the law. What one is being required to accept is that if there is no law on a given issue as a 
matter of fact then that ‘fact’ gives rise automatically to a rule of law in itself. Under this 
‘residual negative principle’ the closed nature of the international legal system “does not only 
exist de facto but de jure”.22  As Kammerhofer correctly points out such a view of the law is 
 
20 Nicaragua, supra note 19, para. 269. 
21 Stone, supra note 4, p. 136. 
22 Weil, supra note 10, p. 112. 
8 
 
based upon a ‘logically bivalent view of normative modality’23 and fails to take account for the 
fact that the law does not concern itself with all forms of behaviour. By way of illustration 
Kammerhofer refers to the act of sharpening a pencil and points out that the law will most 
likely have nothing to say on this act, going on to ask: ‘should we now assume, in order to 
close the legal system, that therefore this behaviour is somehow permitted by law?’24 
 
In his dissenting judgment in the Lotus case, Judge Nyholm was similarly critical of the 
reasoning of the PCIJ, saying:  
 
“The reasoning of the judgment appears to be that, failing a rule of positive law, the 
relations between States in the matter under consideration are governed by an absolute 
freedom… But that is a confusion of ideas. In considering the existing situation of fact, 
a distinction should be drawn between that which is merely an international situation 
of fact and that which constitutes a rule of international law. The latter can only be 
created by special process and cannot be deduced from a situation which is merely one 
of fact.”25  
 
The utilisation of a ‘residual negative principle’ in this way to complete the system does a 
disservice to the development of international law as a coherent body of law. Dealing with gaps 
in this way may secure the formal completeness of international legal system but at the same 
time it diverts attention away from the Court’s important role of ensuring the material 
 
23 J. Kammerhofer, ‘Gaps, The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and the Structure of International 
Legal Argument Between Theory and Practice’, 80 British Yearbook of International Law (2009), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1536582 p. 4 
24 Ibid. 
25 Lotus, supra note17, Dissenting Opinion M Nyholm, p. 60. 
9 
 
completeness of the law.26 This is because where a gap in the law exists, the utilisation of a 
‘residual negative principle’ does nothing to remedy the material gap in the law and thereby 
contributes nothing to the development of the law. It could be said that such an approach merely 
entrenches the gap and arguably obstructs the development of law. Moreover, according to 
Lauterpacht, the utilisation of such an approach by the Court demonstrates an ever-present 
danger in administration of justice in general and in international law in particular in that it 
reduces the role of judges to an automatic function that could “defeat the very end of law.”27 
 
III. Conceiving the completeness of international law as an a priori assumption 
 
An alternative approach to the existence of gaps in international law is the recognition that 
international law is de facto incomplete in a material sense but the international legal system 
provides the means to close any gap, thereby making the international legal system complete; 
but not in the ‘closed’ sense as discussed earlier. 
 
What is meant by ‘complete’ here is that international law does not have a substantive answer 
to every question posed but where there is no specific legal rule the international legal system 
has the techniques and mechanisms for finding the appropriate answer.28 As Weil notes, “Once 
a lacunae is identified, it is neutralized ipso facto. This neutralization, however, does not occur 
automatically in the international legal system; rather, it occurs only when the lacuna comes to 
 
26 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (2011) p. 94. 
27 Ibid. p. 93. 
28 K. Kulovesi, ‘Legality or Otherwise? Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy of Non Liquet, 10 Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law (1999) p. 63; According to Jennings what is meant by complete is “not 
that there is always a clear and specific rule readily applicable to every international situation, but that 
every international situation is capable of being determined as a matter of law, either by the application 
of specific legal rules where they already exist, or by the application of legal rules derived by the use 
of known legal techniques from other legal rules or principles.” R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), 
Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., Vol. 1 (1996) p. 12 
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light judicially. Pending judicial determination, the deficiency persists.”29 Therefore the 
international legal system is seen as ‘self-curative’30 in that where gaps in the law exist, the 
international legal system through judicial activity has the capacity to fill those gaps. 
 
This capacity for self-curing a gap in the law was the basis for Sir Hersch Lauterpacht’s view 
of the completeness of the international legal system. Lauterpacht distanced himself from the 
Kelsenite positivist view of the formal completeness of international law as exemplified by the 
utilisation of a ‘residual negative principle’ to complete the law, as in Lotus and Kosovo. In his 
important work, ‘The Function of Law in the International Community’, Lauterpacht argues 
that the international legal system is ‘materially’ complete because all gaps are eradicated by 
judicial creativity. For Lauterpacht the issue of gaps in the law is bound up with the issue of 
the judicial function and in particular the question of judicial activity. According to Lauterpacht 
where there are no specific rules the question before the Court would still be remediable by the 
legal system. This will be by more abstract rules and judicial creativity. According to 
Lauterpacht there are general principles of law that are recognised by civilised nations that 
represent an “inexhaustible storehouse of potential law”31 that will enable a court to address 
any circumstance in which a gap in the substantive law is perceived and thereby enabling the 
artifice of completeness to be maintained. In particular Lauterpacht pointed to Article 38(1)(c) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, ‘General principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations’ as an important device for remedying any gap within international law. In 
fact Lauterpacht went as far as to argue that “the general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations” in Article 38(1) (c) incorporated the principle of the completeness of the 
 
29 Weil, supra note 10, p. 112 
30 Ibid. p. 110. 
31 Stone, supra note 4, p. 133. 
11 
 
international legal system as a general principle and “definitely removed the last vestige of the 
possibility of gaps.”32  
 
Yet, where the Court is asked to fill a gap by resort to such general principles, how creative 
should a Court be in its interpretation and application of general principles when filling a gap? 
In a domestic common law context this issue has given rise to some heated debate. On the one 
hand it is accepted that a judge would be required to exercise discretion and in many senses to 
take on the role of law-creation, albeit in a limited capacity. The view of the legal system filling 
gaps by the judge exercising ‘limited law-creating discretion’ has been examined by H.L.A 
Hart.33 Hart suggests that the law is inevitably incomplete and goes on to argue that a central 
feature of the judicial function is the exercising of discretion to create law where a gap in the 
law exists.34 But the exercising of law-creating powers by judges; that is the capacity of judges 
to exercise their ‘discretion’ to fill gaps in the law is limited and must be limited. So according 
to Hart, for example, where the judge exercises a law-creating function to fill a gap in the law 
the exercising of this discretion is limited to the extent of dealing with the gap in the context 
of the instant case and not for the introduction of widespread reform. That function is the 
preserve of a legislature.35 On the other hand Dworkin would argue that judges do not exercise 
discretion in the sense characterised by Hart because judges regard themselves as bound by 
law even though no rules are clearly applicable.36 For Dworkin what we understand as the legal 
 
32 Lauterpacht, supra note 26, p. 75. 
33 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1997) p. 272. Although considering the domestic legal system in 
the main Hart’s observations are valid for the international legal system. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Hart, supra note 33, p. 272; Hart goes on to say “But he [the judge] must not do this arbitrarily: that 
is he must always have some general reasons justifying his decision and he must act as a conscientious 
legislator would by deciding according to his own beliefs and values. But if he satisfies these conditions 
he is entitled to follow standards or reasons for decision which are not dictated by the law and may 
differ from those followed by other judges faced with similar hard cases.” 
36 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1978), p. 25 
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system consists of legal rules and legal principles. Where there is no applicable law (legal rule), 
he would argue, judges still apply law through the application of legal principles (as distinct 
from legal rules) which constrain their judicial decision-making and thereby the discretion 
claimed by Hart.37 Dworkin makes note however that there are a number of ways in which 
judges exercise ‘weak’ discretion. For example Dworkin concedes that judges must exercise 
discretion in the sense that they are required to use their judgment in reasoning from legal 
principles to legal conclusions. Moreover, in some instances they have discretion in the final 
judgment of a case. But beyond this, Dworkin is of the view that judges are bound by law even 
where there is an absence of law.    
 
In the international legal system different curative approaches can be and have been utilised by 
various international tribunals in order to deal with perceived gaps in the law. One approach 
could be by means of the tools of authoritative interpretation and decision-making on the 
subject by the Court and this can be done, according to Rosalyn Higgins, by “use of analogy, 
by reference to context, by analysis of the alternative consequences.”38 For many this will be 
familiar and considered the normal process of the development of the law by the inherent 
judicial function of the Court.39 As Gerald Fitzmaurice observed: “It is axiomatic that courts 
of law must not legislate: nor do they overtly purport to do so. Yet it is equally a truism that a 
constant process of development of the law goes on through the courts, a process which 
involves a considerable element of innovation ...  As is well known, they adapt existing 
principles to meet new facts or situations. If none serves, they in effect propound new ones by 
appealing to some antecedent or more fundamental concept, or by invoking doctrines in the 
 
37 Ibid. pp. 31-4 
38 Ibid. p. 10; see also Lauterpacht, supra note 26, p. 119. 
39 See Weil supra note 10, p. 110. 
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light of which an essentially innovatory process can be carried out against a background of 
received legal precept.”40 
 
As noted previously a cornerstone to the assertion of the completeness of the international legal 
system as promoted by Lauterpacht is Article 38(1)(c), which Lauterpacht asserts provides a 
means through which gaps in the law can be remedied or cured. From Lauterpacht’s view of 
Article 38(1)(c) therefore there can be no gaps in the international legal system because it is at 
least arguable, certainly from Dworkin’s perspective, that there will always be a principle of 
law which is capable of interpretation and application to the case in hand. This is particularly 
so given the possibility of recourse to “general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations” as part of the body of international law. For example, in the Barcelona Traction case,41 
when faced with an apparent gap in the law, the Court immediately filled it with recourse to a 
general principle of domestic law regarding the concept of a limited company.42 Moreover, in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 43 which is often cited as an example of the resort equity 
by the ICJ when faced with a gap in the law, the Court rested the criteria applicable to 
continental shelf delimitations directly upon equity rather than upon the extension of existing 
rules and principles of law. In this respect equity was used, not so much to fill a gap in the law, 
but equity was instrumental to the determination of the appropriate application of the existing 
law without which a gap could have appeared.44 In the case the Court stated explicitly that it 
 
40 G. Fitzmaurice, ‘Judicial Innovation - Its Uses and its Perils’ in Cambridge Essays in International 
Law (1965) pp. 24-25. 
41 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, Judgment, 1970 I.C.J., p. 33. 
42 See Weil, supra note 14, p. 111. 
43 North Sea Continental Shelf Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, at para. 88 [Hereinafter North Sea Case]; See 
also South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6, at para. 88, in which the Court referred 
to the application of general principles of law in a negative context. 
44 See Lowe, supra note 51, p. 61. 
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was not “applying equity simply as a matter of abstract justice, but applying a rule of law which 
itself requires the application of equitable principles.”45  
 
Arguably, to suggest today that the Court has a law-creating function is not a matter of 
particular controversy. The judicial function of the Court is and should be something more than 
the “automatic application of existing rules to particular situations.”46 This is all the more 
important if the ‘existing rules’ are contrived from the application of a ‘residual negative 
principle’. So where a gap in the law exists, the interpretative function of judges becomes 
important in addressing the inadequacies of the international legal system.47 Seeing the judicial 
function as including a law-creating function means that a gap in the law should not be assessed 
within the narrow confines of whether there is an existing positive rule to be applied or not. 
Rather than seeing applicable law in terms of the existence of a positive rule, the applicable 
law, and thereby the existence of a gap, should be seen within a broader context that involves 
consideration of “the entirety of legal and social relationships within the Community” and 
“what the legislator would have intended if he could have foreseen the changes occurring in 
the life of the community.”48 Seen this way, law can be product of authoritative decision-
making by the Court. Moreover it is a basis for asserting the view of the completeness of the 
international legal system. This is because where a positive rule does not cover the matter under 
consideration by the Court i.e. there is a gap, viewing the international legal system and the 
judicial function in this way enables the Court to fill the gap by using its interpretative 
discretion in authoritative decision-making.  
 
 
45  North Sea Case, supra note 53, para 85. 
46 R. Higgins, Themes & Theories: Selected Essays, Speeches, and Writings in International Law Vol. 
1 (2009) p. 28 
47 Higgins, supra note 46, p. 28 ; See also Lauterpacht, supra note 26, p. 78 
48 Lauterpacht, supra note 26, p. 88 
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According to Higgins, in contemporary terms such a view would be described as a policy-
orientated approach to international law: “It urges that, in these ‘unclear’ areas at least, 
attention be paid to the entirety of relationships in the community; it emphasized development; 
and it refutes the charge that such an approach is arbitrary.”49 If one sees the international legal 
system in these terms then, as Higgins would assert: “There are no events which are inherently 
beyond authoritative decision-making”. Where a gap exists the Court has the power to decide 
a matter before them “on the basis of either explicit rules and principles or on the basis of 
unarticulated principles, general aims and values underlying the legal system.”50 Thereby the 
international legal system can be said to be ‘complete’ without being ‘closed’ and resort to 
relying on the reductive reasoning of a ‘residual negative principle’. 
 
IV. Conceiving the neutrality of international law 
 
In his Separate Declaration to the Kosovo Advisory Opinion Judge Bruno Simma presented a 
number of criticisms of the majority judgment. The full range of these criticisms will not be 
addressed here.51 Of particular interest to this article, however, is Judge Simma’s identification 
of what he sees as a “wider conceptual problem”52 with the approach of the Court. In his view 
the Court could have considered the scope of the question put to it from an approach which did 
not, in a formalistic fashion, equate the absence of a prohibition with the existence of a 
permissive rule.53 He felt the Court was provided with the opportunity to move away from the 
‘binary’ approach to the analysis of international law favoured by advocates of the ‘Lotus 
 
49 Higgins, supra note 46, p. 30 
50 I.F. Dekker & W.G. Werner, ‘The Completeness of International Law and Hamlet’s Dilemma, Non 
Liquet, The Nuclear Weapons Case and Legal Theory’, (1999) 69 Nordic Journal of International Law 
p. 230. 
51 See generally Kosovo supra note 1, Separate Declaration Judge Simma. 
52 Ibid, para. 8. 
53 See Kosovo supra note 1, Separate Declaration Judge Simma, para. 3; 
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principle’ and, in particular, it had the opportunity to explore ‘whether international law can be 
deliberately neutral or silent on a certain issue’54 and thereby incomplete as a system of law. 
Rather than limiting “itself merely to an exercise in mechanical jurisprudence”, Judge Simma 
was advocating a more creative approach by the Court to the exercise of its interpretive function 
when faced with a gap in the law;55 one that includes not only stating the law “as it is, with its 
prescriptive, prohibitive, or permissive rules”56 but also includes recognising its gaps and 
incompleteness.  
 
However, the assertion of the possibility of international law’s neutrality raises the question of 
how one conceives of this idea. Notably, beyond claiming the Court should have considered 
the matter, Judge Simma provided, at best, very limited guidance about how one can conceive 
of the concept of ‘legally neutral’ behaviour. For example in paragraph 3 of his separate 
declaration he asserts that the Court could have ‘considered the possibility that international 
law can be neutral… on the international lawfulness of certain acts’ [Emphasis added] but he 
provides no explanation of what this means beyond declaring in paragraph 9 that ‘[t]he 
neutrality of international law on a certain point simply suggests that there are areas where 
international law has not yet come to regulate, or indeed, will never come to regulate.’57. For 
instance, some explanation of what he meant by ‘neutral’ and some explanation of the 
presumptions about the structure of the international legal system to sustain the possibility of 
international law’s neutrality he was making, would have been helpful. A potentially helpful 
guide to understanding Judge Simma’s claim about the possibility of international law being 
 
54 The question of whether international law might be silent on the issue of Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence was discussed in some detail in the Written Statement of Germany submitted to the Court. 
See Kosovo supra note , Statement of the Federal Republic of Germany, April 2009, 27-32;  
55 Kosovo supra note 1, Separate Declaration Judge Simma, para. 10. 
56 Weil, supra note 10, p. 117. 
57 See Kosovo supra note 1, Separate Declaration Judge Simma, paras. 3 & 9 
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neutral on a matter is the work of Ilmar Tammelo, on the logical openness of legal orders.58 He 
for example, defines the concept of ‘legally neutral’ to mean:  
 
‘Where a legal order does not contain any norm specifying how to qualify legally the 
behaviour about which the law in question is silent, obscure, or self-contradictory, one 
can say that it has left such matters completely at large. It has neither “willed” to 
regulate these matters in a certain way nor has it “willed not to will” their regulation.’59 
 
As already discussed, according to Judge Simma the resort of the Court to the use of a ‘residual 
negative principle’ and thereby the conception of international law as a logically closed system 
of law was a mistake. It would seem that in his view, because international law on the question 
presented to the Court was silent on the matter, i.e. there was no norm that prohibited the 
behaviour, nor obligated behaviour, nor permitted behaviour, then international law is neutral 
through its silence because, in line with Tammelo, it has ‘neither “willed” to regulate these 
matters in a certain way nor has it “willed not to will” their regulation.’  
 
An important factor to understanding of the idea of ‘legally neutral’ behaviour; and key to 
understanding the approach advocated by Judge Simma, is the recognition of  the international 
legal system as a logically open or incomplete normative system; one in which there can be an 
absence of law in the form of gaps.60 Whereas ‘legally neutral’ behaviour is a corollary of this 
open/incomplete condition of the international legal system,61 it is excluded in a 
 
58 I. Tammelo supra note 5,  pp. 187-203 
59 I. Tammelo supra note 5, p. 194; Kammerhofer supra note 23, p. 5 
60 I. Tammelo supra note 5,  p. 192; see generally Kammehofer for recent and detailed analysis of gaps 
in international law, Kammerhofer states for example that legally neutral behaviour can only exist in an 
open system. Kammerhofer supra note 23 
61 Kammerhofer states for example that legally neutral behaviour can only exist in an open system.  
Kammerhofer supra note 23, p. 5 
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logically/formally closed system. This is because in a logically/formally closed system 
behaviour is either prohibited or permitted, meaning that in the apparent absence of law the 
‘residual negative principle’ is applied that forecloses any gap; meaning there is no absence of 
law.62  
 
So, is it conceivable that the international legal system can be logically open/incomplete and is 
‘legally neutral’ behaviour possible, as suggested by Judge Simma? According to Tammelo, 
clearly both of these possibilities are conceivable. He states, for example, that ‘[t]here appears 
to be no a priori reason why a legal order would not be a logically open normative system.’63 
Whilst he acknowledges that the idea that all legal systems are logically closed or complete is 
one that is widely held,64 he goes on to argue that there is no evidence of a norm of general 
international law that directly establishes its logical completeness.65 A view clearly shared by 
Judge Simma.  
 
Moreover with respect to the possibility of international law being neutral on a matter, in 
applying the principles of modal logic, Tammelo explains that in the ‘legal universe’, there 
exists a number of deontic modes which he describes as ‘deontic circumstances of juristic 
concern’,66 ranging from behaviour that is ‘obligatory’, ‘prohibitory’, ‘licensory’, ‘permissory’ 
‘allowable’ and includes, ‘legally neutral’ behaviour.67 In his analysis of the question the 
possibility of legally neutral behaviour Kammerhofer clarifies that whereas “[i]n a closed 
 
62 I. Tammelo supra note 5, p. 200; Kammerhofer supra note 23,  p. 5 
63 I. Tammelo supra note 5, p. 200  
64 Ibid., p. 188 
65 Ibid., p. 201 
66 Tammelo explains that deontic modes are ‘technical terms used by logicians for signifying notions 
such as “obligatory”, “forbidden”, and “permitted” by which various kinds of behaviour in relation to 
normative orders are differentiated and logically apprehended.’ I. Tammelo supra note 5, p. 195  
67 I. Tammelo supra note 5, p. 195 ; see also Kammerhofer supra note 23, p. 5 
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system the relationship between ‘obligatory’ and… [‘licensory’], on the one hand, and 
‘prohibitory’ and ‘permissory’, on the other is a dichotomic exclusion”, i.e. behaviour is either 
“prohibited or permitted, but cannot be anything else”, which equates to a ‘residual negative 
principle’.68 On the other hand: “In open legal systems… while an obligation to do something 
and a right not to do something contradict, it is not the case that there must exist either the 
obligation or the right.”69  Julius Stone put it thus: ‘There may be conduct which does not fall 
within any of the modalities which characterise a closed system, that is, which may be neither 
prohibited by a norm, nor made obligatory by a norm, nor permitted by a norm. There may, be 
in short, the category of conduct…which is neither prohibited, not required nor permitted by 
the norms. There may be conduct, that is, about which the norms say nothing at all.’70 It would 
seem that it was in this sense that Judge Simma was envisaging the possibility of international 
law being neutral on a matter when he suggested that there are areas where international law 
has not yet come to regulate, or indeed, will never come to regulate.71 If in an open legal order 
international law is indifferent to the behaviour in question then it is possible to say that 
international law neither ‘willed’ nor “willed not to will” regulate matters and is thereby neutral 
in the sense posited by Tammelo. 
 
However, how will recognising that international law is legally neutral on a matter affect 
international law’s coherence? Will declaring that the law is silent or neutral on a matter make 
international law incoherent?72 In judge Simma’s view recognising international laws 
neutrality would give rise to ‘no wider conceptual problem relating to the coherence of the 
 
68 Kammerhofer supra note 23, p. 5 
69 Ibid. 
70  J. Stone, “Non-Liquet and the Judicial function”, in: Ch. Perelman (ed.), La problem des lancunes 
en droit (Presses Universitaires, Bruxelles, 1968), p. 309 taken from Dekker &Werner, supra note 50, 
p. 236 at footnote 40 
71 See Kosovo supra note 1, Separate Declaration Judge Simma, para. 9 
72 Ibid. 
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international legal order.’73  It could be said that by declaring that the law is silent or neutral 
on a matter undermines law’s validity. On the other hand one could argue that declaring the 
law is silent or neutral on a matter does not in itself make international law incoherent; rather 
as Weil suggests for instance, ‘[a]s long as no clear rule has emerged from the norm-creating 
process, there is simply no legal truth…’.74 By declaring the law neutral or silent on a matter 
merely acknowledges the state that international law is in at the given time. But, whilst the 
declaration of international law’s neutrality on a matter may be conceptually coherent, in 
practical terms it is open to question whether there is actually any difference between a 
declaration of law’s neutrality and the resort to a residual negative principle – which Judge 
Simma clearly rejects as a proposition. If international law is neutral towards certain behaviour 
then it is de facto allowing it to continue. For those concerned, how does this differ from the 
outcome of applying a residual negative principle? One could argue that a declaration that the 
law in its current state is neutral or silent on a matter or the law is unclear and thus the Court is 
unable to decide on a matter is a legitimate response that can be seen as constructive to the 
future development of international law in a way that the resort to denying the existence of a 
gap in the law as an a priori condition is not. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this article has been two-fold. The first part sought to evaluate critically the 
idea of the ‘closed’ nature of the international legal system on the one hand and the idea of the 
‘completeness’ of the international legal system on the other hand. The second part has been 
to examine Judge Simma’s view of ‘the possibility that international law can be neutral… on 
 
73 Ibid. 
74 P. Weil, Le droit international en quête de son identité: cours general de droit international public, 
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the international lawfulness of certain acts.’75 This is not merely an academic issue. With the 
ever increasing resort by States to the adjudication of disputes arising from new developments 
in contemporary relations inevitably there will be areas of conflict and dispute for which 
international law will have no ready answer. For example, disputes arising from territorial 
claims, maritime disputes and disputes over resources. Inevitably there will be new situations 
in respect of which the law is unclear or to which it does not yet extend, meaning gaps in 
international law do and will arise.  
 
This article has sought to evaluate three different approaches to the understanding of 
international law’s normative order. On the one hand is the tired, anachronistic view of 
international law as a closed normative order premised on the archly positivist approach that 
involves resort to a ‘residual negative principle’ whereby what is not expressly prohibited in 
international law is permitted. Thereby closing out the possibility of gaps in international law 
existing. As discussed this view of international law, although raising its head in the recent 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, is to be avoided. This is because employing such reductive 
reasoning is argued to be both limiting to the development of international law and a reneging 
of the court’s essential interpretive function, which is a fundamental aspect of the exercise of 
its judicial function. The resort to a ‘residual negative principle’ in response to an absence of 
law leaves the law undeveloped as the gap is closed by a general proposition that effectively 
denies the existence of the gap. The effect of this is to negate the laws development because it 
leaves the material gap unaddressed. Employing such reductive reasoning is argued to be both 
limiting to the development of international law and a reneging of the court’s essential 
interpretive role, which is a fundamental aspect of the exercise of its judicial function. 
 
 
75 See Kosovo supra note 1, Separate Declaration Judge Simma, para. 3 
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However, that international law contains material gaps is well recognised. Courts and tribunals 
in both domestic legal systems and in the international legal system are constantly being 
presented with new situations in respect of which the law is unclear or to which it does not yet 
extend. In this sense therefore international law could be described as incomplete in nature. As 
we have discussed, however, the fact material gaps exist in the law does not negate the 
possibility of the international legal system being a ‘complete’ normative order. This is because 
the international system has the capacity to fill such gaps by employing recognisable and 
accepted legal devices and reasoning, such as general principles of law and reasoning by 
analogy; thereby making the international legal system ‘complete’ ex post facto.76  In contrast 
to the ‘closed’ system which negates the development of the law and leaves the material gap 
unaddressed, the process of a court or tribunal filling a gap in such a manner is what most 
would understand as the court or tribunal exercising its judicial function. 
 
In the final part of this article we considered Judge Simma’s view that international law can be 
neutral on a matter, thereby giving rise to a gap. The key understanding here is the idea of the 
international system being a logically ‘open’ or ‘incomplete’ system of law whereby gaps exist. 
Here we considered the question of how one can conceive of the neutrality of international law, 
assisted by the insights gained through the application of the principles of modal logic. It was 
concluded that it is possible to conceive of international law’s neutrality on a matter and such 
an idea would not give rise to international law’s incoherence. On the contrary, in contrast to 
adopting a ‘closed’ view of the international legal system, recognising international law’s 
neutrality can be constructive to its future development in a way that applying a residual 
negative principle is not. That said, there is some difficulty in seeing the practical difference 
between Judge Simma’s view of international law being neutral on a matter and the resort to a 
 
76 See Weil, supra note 10, p. 110 
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residual negative principle. As already noted, if international law is ‘neutral’ towards certain 
behaviour then it is, de facto, allowing it to continue, arguably, in the same way as applying a 
residual negative principle as discussed.  
